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Abstract
This paper reviews the background and current status of relationship banking in Japan. First,
the composition and share of the banking sector in the total financial market are discussed along
with the measures taken in the banking sector after the burst of the bubble economy. Second,
relationship banking is defined with its merits and demerits. Third, the nature of relationship
banking in Japan is argued. Finally, the effects of relationship banking are examined. The evi-
dence from various theoretical and empirical studies has indicated that relationship banking
reduces information asymmetry and risk, mitigates liquidity constraints and contributes as res-
cues in financial distress. However these benefits are often obtained by the firms at the cost of
higher rents through higher lending interest rates.
Key words: relationship banking, corporate governance, information asymmetry, liquidity con-
straints
1. Introduction
Bank-based financial system of corporate financing and governance is regarded as one of the
best suited alternatives for Asian economies. This is due to the absence of strong financial mar-
ket and regulatory bodies to supply funds and support their corporate firms in times of financial
distress. Accordingly, the American model of corporate governance, where banks are prohibit-
ed by legislation to exercise close monitoring on client firm's decisions, is difficult to replicate in
Asian economies. Among Asian economies Japan is the role model for bank-based corporate
governance system. The corporate governance which the Japanese banks exercise by establish-
ing a long-term relationship with the corporate firms attracted lot of attentions and become an
area of great interest for Asian economies. On this background, this paper reviews the nature
and status of such relationship banking in Japan and also its effect on the performance and
profitability of the corporate borrowers. The results of this study are expected to reveal sugges-
tions to Asian economies about the pros and cons of relationship banking and the way for
replicating this system to their particular banking systems.
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Fig.! Financial institutions operating in Japan as of 2001
Source: Complied from Bank of Japan, 2005 and Japanese Bankers Association, 2005
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2. Recent State of Banking Sector of Japan
Japanese firms depend more on debt than on issuing stocks. Banks play the most dominant
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Fig.2 Raising and lending of funds by the financial institutions in Japan at the end of 2000
(The black pieces of the pies represent the share of the banking sector)
Source: Bank of Japan, 2005 and Japanese Bankers Association, 2005
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Table 1 Main measures to stabilize the banking sector after the burst of bubble economy
1. Dealing with bad loans
a) Classification and disclosure of bad loans
To tackle bad loans, the Banking Law instructed banks classify their assets into four categories and
disclose:
I . Loans to borrowers in legal bankruptcy;
II. Past due loans in arrears by six months or more;
ill. Past due loans in arrears by three months or more; and
]v. Restructured loans.
b) Writing-off of bad loans from balance sheets
The emergency economic package revealed on April 2001, instructed writing off of bad loans from
the bank's balance sheet within 2 years for existing bad loans.
2. Limitation on bank shareholdings
According to the Japanese Anti-Monopoly Law, banks can hold up to 5 percent of a firm's stock
(prior to 1987 up to 10 percent) on their own account. On 2001 the Financial Council report sug-
gested a proposal to restrict the total shareholding by banks exceeding their own capital from 2004.
3. Establishing the banks shareholdings purchase cooperation
Bank's Shareholding Purchase Corporation was established on January 30, 2002 to absorb the ex-
cess supply of shares due to the implementation of limited shareholding law.
4. Removal of full deposit insurance
The full deposit protection provided under the Deposit Insurance Law of 1996 is revised on April
2002. Accordingly, deposit insurance will protect deposits up to 10 million yen plus interest per
depositor.
Source: Stabilizing the financial system, Japanese Bankers Association, 2005.
institutions operating in Japan). The share of banks is approximately 60 percent in both rais-
ing and lending of funds among all the financial institutions (see Fig.2). This indicates the ac-
tive role of banking sector in financial markets. Even after financial liberalizations and burst of
the bubble economy in 1991, this dominance of the banking system is still prevalent. Table 1
summarizes the various measures taken to reform and stabilize the banking sector throughout
the last ten years. The main purpose has surely been to cope with diminishing bad loans (non-
performing loans) within the sector. According to Financial Services Agency, the measures
could basically be classified into a) summary of the program for further financial reformation,
b) program for financial revival, c) new deposit insurance system, amid the deregulation and/
or liberalization of banking and financial industries in Japan.
The government has also adopted the action program in March 2003 and new legislation and
its implementation in August 2004 for relationship banking and risk management aiming to
reform management performance of small- and medium-sized businesses, promote regional eco-
nomic activities, along with further amendment of financial status of the banks and other finan-






Fig.3 Concept of relationship banking
3. Defining Relationship Banking
The term relationship banking is still vague and not clearly defined in various literatures.
Berger (1999) specified the existence of relationship banking where the following three condi-
tions are met:
i . the intermediary gathers information beyond readily available public information;
ii. information gathering takes place over time through multiple interactions with the
borrower, often through the provision of multiple financial services;
iii. the information remains confidential.
Boot (2000) also stated relationship banking somewhat in the same direction, as the provi-
sion of financial services by a financial intermediary that might invest in obtaining customer-
specific information, often proprietary in nature; and evaluate the profitability of the invest-
ments through interactions with the same customer over time and/or across products.
The relationship banking esteemed from the Japanese main bank system is often defined as
the relationship of the bank having the largest loan share with the firm is not true as largest loan
share often changes in times of sudden long term borrowing from long term credit or trust
banks (Hirota and Horiuchi, 2001).
Thus from the above discussion the term relationship banking can be defined as a long term
relationship between the financial intermediary and the corporate firm developed by repeated
interactions transpired from diversified transactions, accumulation of specific information and
major loan concentration. This overlapping aspects which give birth to relationship banking are
described by Fig.3.
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4. Merits and Demerits of Relationship Banking
There are various merits and demerits of relationship banking. These are summarized in
Table 2 with reference to the relevant literatures.












Due to relationship banking a borrowing firm might disclose specific in-
formation to its bank which would never been disclosed to the financial
markets (Bhattacharya and Chiesa, 1995). The firm would be willing to
do so as the bank is the financier and need to worry about information
leakage to competitors (Boot, 2000).
Relationship banking provides less rigid nature of relationship compared
to capital market funding, as rearrangement of the contract can be done
easily and can improve welfare (Boot et al. 1993).
Inclusion of covenants in relationship lending might provide a chance for
better control of potential conflicts of interest and reduce agency costs
(Boot, 2000). As lending contracts are easy to renegotiate compared to
other bond issues or public capital market funding instruments, strict and
detailed covenants can be included (Berlin and Mester, 1992).
Bank lending contract can include collateral which is proved to be effec-
tive in mitigating moral hazard and adverse selection problems in loan
contracting (Chan and Thakor, 1987). Monitoring of collateral is possi-
ble with closeness and proprietary information obtained from relationship
banking.
Relationship banking allows the bank to provide loans which are not
profitable in the short-term, as it can compensate the former with higher
rents from the borrower in the long-term. This is known as intertemporal
transfers in loan pricing (Berlin and Mester, 1992; Boot, 2000).
Relationship banking might lower investment efficiency due to soft-budg-
et constraints (Bolton and Scharfstein, 1996). This is due to the flexibil-
ity in loan negotiations would provide less incentive in making efficient
investment of borrowed funds.
In relationship banking the bank might charge higher lending rate as it
has information monopoly and the borrower can not turn to other lenders
(Nam, 2004).
Firms having relationship banking might take too few risky investments
as the bank will discourage projects with high risk and high return.
(Nam, 2004).
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5. Relationship Banking in Japan
In Japan, where the size of the banking sector to GNP is the largest, we can find the most
typical and conventional nature of relationship banking. This kind of relationship is also inter-
changeably referred to as 'main bank' relationship. According to Aoki, Patrick and Sheard
(1994), there are five main aspects of relationship banking in Japan, such as, bank loans;
bond issue related services; shareholding; payment settlement account; and supply of
management and information resources.
As shown in the Fig.5, financing aspect refers to bank loans and bond issue related serv-
ices, of which bank loan has been traditionally the key one. While settlement accounts, stock-
holding and supply of management resources are the monitoring and governance aspect of the
relationship. In Japan this second dimension of the bank-firm relationship is ensured by the fol-
lowing activities:
5.1 Stockholding of Firms
In Japan a bank maintains a substantial stockholding in the firms to which it acts as a main
bank. According to the Japanese Anti-Monopoly Law, banks can hold up to 5 percent of a firm's
stock (prior to 1987 up to 10 percent) on their own account. But on 2001 the Financial
Council report suggested a proposal to restrict the total shareholdingby banks exceeding their
own capital from 2004 as soon as possible. The main bank usually is in the top five sharehol-
ders of the client firm and is normally the top shareholder among banks. This enables the main













~ Settlement of Accounts
~ Supply of Management
Information and Resources.
Fig.5 Aspects of bank-firm relationship
Source: Ahmed and Fukaura (2001)
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Fig.6 Loan Syndication Procedure under Japanese Banking System
Source: Ahmed and Fukaura (2001)
5.2 Supply of Management Resources
In Japan bank often sends its mangers as directors or auditors on the board of client firms. In
1992, about one quarter (24.4 percent) of the 40,045 directors of listed Japanese firms were
from outside the firm (Aoki et aL 1994). Of those about one-fifth (21.7 percent, or just over
5 percent of all directors) were from banks (Kigyo Keiretsu Soran, 1992). The shifts of
managers from the main bank to its customer firms promote close management relationship and
enable the transfer of management know-how. On the other hand banks can also prevent the
board of directors of the firm from making an illegal or seriously unjust decision.
5.3 Loan Syndication
Another unique nature of bank-firm relationship in Japan is the reciprocal delegated monitoring
in the form of loan syndication. For example banks A, B, and C lends to firms X, Y and Z. Then
A will serve as main bank to X, B as the main bank to Y, and C to Z (see Fig.6). The main
bank is expected to play the leading role in case of corporate distress and organizes financial
rescue, restructuring and bear a disproportionate share of the costs of financial assistance in
terms of interest exemptions or deferrals, loan rescheduling, loan losses and new fund supply
relative to the syndicate as a whole (Aoki et aL 1994). In Japan all these above corporate
monitoring and governance have been made possible by the main bank because it is the stock-
holder, got management representatives and is also major settler of payment accounts for bor-
rowing firms.
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6. Effect of Relationship Banking in Japan
Now let us examine the effect of relationship banking practices in Japan by gathering exam-
ples from various theoretical and empirical literatures.
6.1 Availability of Credit
The first question regarding the impact of relationship banking is whether it made it easy for
the firms in accessing to credit. Many studies concluded that Japanese firms with relationship
bank enjoy easier access to credit and did not fall into liquidity constraints (Fukuda and Hiro-
ta, 1996). Also there are studies drawing opposite conclusions too. For example, Hayashi
(2000) finds no evidence that relationship banking esteemed from main banking did not help
the firm in meeting liquidity crisis.
6.2 Rescuing in Financial Distress
It is widely argued that, relationship banking is very much effective in rescuing firms in times
of financial distress. Based on the information obtained as result of relationship banking, banks
tend to respond quickly to the distress by mitigating liquidity shortfalls, debt restructuring and
operational restructuring of borrower firms (Nam, 2004). Japanese firms with strong main
bank relationship seem to have better been protected than those without such relationship
(Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein, 1990; Okazaki and Horiuchi, 1992).
6.3 Reduction of Risk
Relationship banking can contribute in reducing risk of corporate borrowers by assisting the
firms in times of financial distress and reducing corporate financial fluctuations. Considerable
amount of loans supplied to a firm send positive signal to the market participants concerning the
quality of the borrower, its profitability and its riskiness (Uchida, 1997). Firms with bank
borrowing pay lower interest rate premium in times of financial distress as observed through
1964 to 1993 (Kawai, Hashimoto and Izumida, 1996).
6.4 Performance of Borrowing Firms
Relationship banking is believed to solve the problem information asymmetry, liquidity con-
straints and agency problem. But this does not mean that this improves the performance of the
corporate firms. According to Hosono (1997), the lending interest rate spread was significant-
ly negatively affected by the main bank loan ratio in total debt during the 1982 to 1995 period
for the exchange-listed Japanese firms. However Japanese main banks extracted higher rents
through higher than average lending rates before financial market liberalization in the 1980s
(Weinstein and Yafeh, 1998).
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7. Conclusion
We have conducted a comprehensive literature survey-based study for grasping the nature
and effect of relationship banking prevailing in Japan. The findings of the study might be sum-
marized and concluded as follows:
(1) Relationship banking is formed between a bank and a corporate firm by meeting three
conditions: repeated interactions through various transactions, accumulation of specific
information and major loan concentration.
(2) Relationship banking can be seen in the Japanese banking system through holding of
shares, supply of management resources and loan monitoring by syndication.
(3) The positive effects of relationship are the reduction of information asymmetry, easier
access to credit, allowing the borrowing firm to mitigate liquidity constraints, reduction
of risk and rescuing in financial distress. However there are literatures having contradic-
tory results as to the impact of relationship banking on the performance of the firms.
Results of some of the studies blamed banks for taking higher rents through higher lend-
ing interest rates.
In this place we can conclude that relationship banking has many positive and also some nega-
tive impact on the Japanese economy. In a country where capital markets and supporting
regulatory systems are not well developed, relationship based banking system might be consi-
dered as one of the alternatives for promoting industrial growth by entrusting corporate gover-
nance in the hands of banks. But enough care should be provided in replicating the system, so
that it turns banks do not exploit the corporate firms in the name of corporate governance.
Note
1) As for the regional banking in Japan see Uchida (1995, 2004) for instance.
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